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Introduction  
 
 
The concept of business models has been increasingly discussed in academic literature since the 
advent of internet and proliferation of e-businesses in the 1990s (Morris et al., 2005). To attract 
funding, the early “dot.com” companies used the idea of business models to pitch the 
attractiveness of their proposed business ventures (Shafer et al, 2005). Its literature 
encompasses several themes contributing to key concepts of a business model. First, value 
drivers are important elements for businesses and new business models are often a 
consequence of changes in these value drivers. These are defined as value-creating activities or 
transformations that generate revenue for the firm (Chesbrough 2007). Second, the 
performance of a company, through the change in such value drivers, is an essential element in 
a business model. Literature have described performance of business models as that which 
requires a joined-up, systems-focused and holistic understanding across the firm’s existing 
resources and capabilities to retain or achieve a competitive advantage in the industry it sits 
within as environmental conditions change (Wirtz et al., 2010).  
 
Third, the formation of successful partnerships is a feature of new business models. This is 
echoed in strategy literature where the ability to establish strong partnerships as capabilities is 
recognised as core-competencies (Johnson et al., 2008). According to Demil and Lecocq (2010), 
the firm’s “value chain of activities” should include the fostering of partnerships as part of the 
building blocks of a business model. Clearly, business models exhibit a need to be value-driven, 
partnership focused, and with the unit of analysis centred on the value-creating system which 
spans boundaries (Zott & Amit, 2010). There is also the need to understand the inter- or intra-
organisational activities that contribute to that system, of which revenues are derived from its 
performance. 
Despite the proliferation of the term, we argue that the academic study of business models is 
weak in three areas. First, new business models emerge across different industries in different 
ways and there may be greater heterogeneity both in its theoretical conceptualisation and its 
empirical and practice characterisation. This is evidenced by the number and the inconsistency 
of “key concepts” that seem to emerge from the literature, as well as the different definitions 
of a business model ranging from “an underlying core logic” (Shafer et al., 2005) to “system 
manifested in the components” (Tikkanen 2005).  
 
Second, it is also important to not only understand the key concepts, but also to appreciate 
how these concepts such as value drivers, partnerships, customer centricity relate to one 
another both theoretically and empirically, and how they manifest themselves in practice for 
different types of business models. Finally, since business model investigations require a holistic 
approach, there should be a concerted attempt to bring together extant approaches of the 
various disciplines of marketing, strategy, operations, OBHRM in a trans-disciplinary manner, 
and into an empirical context, to understand the characterisation of new business models so as 
to both critique and draw insights into intra-disciplinary assumptions. Only when the new 
knowledge is reconciled with the existing, can we build on its scholarship and transfer the 
knowledge of business models across other new contexts. 
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Our study examines a particular new business model of outcome-based contracts (OBC) in 
equipment service, and empirically investigates the firm’s capability to achieve the 
performance required. Equipment-based services have traditionally been contracted on the 
basis of revenue-generating activities, materials and time required to maintain, repair or 
overhaul equipment such as engines and  elevators. This often results in provider opportunism 
since the very activities that disrupt the customer’s use of the equipment are those that 
generate revenue for the firm, and the firm has less incentive to ensure the long-term care of 
the customer’s equipment.  
 
Recently, OBC for equipment-based service have come into prominence in both practice and 
theory (Ng et. al., 2009; Ng & Nudurupati, 2010). With outcome-based contracts such as Rolls-
Royce’s “Power-by-the-hour®”, the firm is paid not according to its service activities such as 
material and repairs, but based on the outcome of such activities in continual use situations i.e. 
the number of hours of engine in the air. This is analogous to the well-known story in marketing 
of being paid for holes-in-walls, rather than for the maintenance, repair and upkeep of the drill 
(Levitt, 1960). This new business model is challenging because continual use of equipment sits 
within the customer’s space and requires the customer’s resources to achieve their own goals. 
From the delivery standpoint, OBC is unlike traditional service contracts where there is a 
sequential process (call comes in, processes triggered, equipment repaired, activities invoiced). 
In OBC, there is usually no sequential ‘value chain’ to speak of; effective equipment use is a 
consequence of collaborative processes and practices with the customer in a value creating 
system to achieve positive outcomes. Achieving performance is therefore dependent on the 
nexus of logistics, relationships, operations and management within the system and how they 
come together effectively so that engines continue to generate power and planes continue to 
fly. Such a system requires a complete rethink of the firm’s business model and its capability, in 
particular its capability to cooperate reciprocally with the customer. We argue that such a 
business model capability would require all stakeholders to invest in relational assets that are 
value-driven and partnership-focused.  
 
Our investigation begins with a qualitative study within which we found three value drivers that 
are part of the value creating transformations of the system. These are material 
transformation, information transformation and behavioural transformation. From the review 
of a diverse set of theoretical literature in operations, OBHRM, strategy and marketing, we 
integrate the literature with our qualitative findings and propose five value-driven and 
partnership constructs we consider to be relational specific assets (cf. Madhok and Tallman, 
1998) for OBC. We hypothesise the relationships between the constructs and contract 
performance, with two intervening variables from OBHRM literature. We subsequently 
operationalise the variables and quantitatively investigate their interactions and impact on 
contract performance through a survey. We then analyse the resultant two partnership input 
constructs, three value-driven alignments, and the intervening variables with Partial Least 
Square (PLS) analysis. Our analysis reveals that, counter-intuitively, OBC performance is 
dependent on the relational assets of behavioural and information alignment rather than on 
material/equipment process alignment (i.e. the joint supply chain). This suggests that the new 
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business model of OBC has to completely re-think how the supply chain towards equipment 
should be designed and configured for consistent use outcomes since the system of material 
and equipment use interacts with other value drivers and is no longer linear.Our results also 
show that all three alignments are driven by partnership inputs of complementary 
competencies and congruence of expectations, and the relationships are further mediated by 
HR constructs of perceived control and empowerment of individuals. This means that the 
complex value creating system in OBC includes multiple management interactions to achieve 
contract performance and it is a challenge to understand where management begins and 
operations end. These cross-function interactions suggest that more research is needed on how 
firms could be better organized to achieve outcomes with their customers in this new business 
model but also to consider how disciplinary knowledge can stay relevant when boundaries 
between them collapse. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. We first review relevant literature to set the foundation for 
this study. We then introduce the research context and the qualitative study. Based on the 
findings from the qualitative study, we further propose several hypotheses to be tested in a 
quantitative study.  The result of the quantitative study is then reported, followed by discussion 
and conclusion.  
 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH CONTEXT 
  
2. 1 Business Models 
The concept of business models has been increasingly discussed in academic literature since the 
advent of the Internet and proliferation of e-businesses in the 1990s. Academic use of terms 
such as “internet business models”, “e-business models” and “new business models” appeared 
to compare and demonstrate how firms successfully or unsuccessfully conducted their 
businesses (Osterwalter et al., 2005). For example, Johnson et al (2008) discussed how Apple’s 
new business model combining “hardware, software and service” elements were more 
effective in revolutionising digital and portable entertainment compared to earlier pioneering 
firms such as Diamond Multimedia in the 1990s. Conversely, Pisano (2006) examined how 
biotech companies suffer from a flawed business model.  
 
In management studies, its research appears to have grown independently with little cross-
disciplinary understanding (Zott et al., 2011). However, despite differing views, most marketing 
research seem to agree that business models comprise concepts relating to the ‘firms value 
offering’, ‘economic model’, ‘customer interface and relationships’, ‘partner network and roles’, 
‘internal infrastructure/connected activities’ and ‘target markets’ (Morris et al., 2005). 
Nonetheless, the precise definition of a business model has been elusive. For instance, Shafer et 
al (2005) define business models as “a representation of a firm’s underlying core logic and 
strategic choices for creating and capturing value within a value network”, while Zott and Amit 
(2007) consider it as “the structure, content, and governance of transactions between the focal 
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firm and its exchange partners, and represents a conceptualization of the pattern of 
transactional links between the firm and its exchange partners.” 
 
Other notable definitions include “system manifested in the components and related material 
and cognitive aspects comprising key components including the company’s network of 
relationships, operations and resource base” (Tikkanen et al., 2005) and “configurations of 
interrelated capabilities, governing the content, process and management of the interaction 
and exchange in dyadic value co-creation” (Nenonen & Storbacka, 2010). 
 
Notwithstanding, common themes have arisen from its substantial body of research. Shafer et 
al (2005) suggest that business models can be classified into four primary components; strategic 
choices, the value network, creating value, and capturing value. Alternatively, Baden-Fuller and 
Morgan (2010) propose that the study of business models means understanding scale models 
(taxonomy) and role models (typology) where successful firms that shape their industries 
inspire others to directly imitate their business model. Business models can also be studied as 
an organism model in biology, stimulating thoughts of systems thinking for understanding how 
knowledge is built in a peculiar discipline (Creager et al., 2007). Similarly, Zott et al (2011) 
recently proposed four emerging themes (a) the business model should be seen as the unit of 
analysis rather than in its component parts, (b) there is a need for systems-level thinking in 
business models because dynamic activities are performed by the firm and by third parties 
(partners, suppliers, customers) as part of the firm’s business venture, (c) these organisational 
activities play an important role, and (d) business models seek to explain how value is captured 
and created i.e. how value is created at the different levels of the organisation as well as with 
the different stakeholders connected to the organisation.  
 
For the purpose of our study, we highlight three over-arching themes that have been presented 
as key concepts of business models. First, value drivers are important elements for businesses 
and new business models often are a consequence of changes in these value drivers (Ehret & 
Wirtz, 2010). In operations management, value drivers are viewed  to be value-creating 
activities or transformations that generate revenue for the firm, i.e. what the firm actually does 
(Yip, 2004). For example, Motorola moved from making consumer electronics components in 
the 1970s to producing more high-technology industrial and mobile telecommunications 
devices in the 1990s when the technology landscape changed in favour of more advanced 
mobile communications devices. Similarly, Microsoft moved from personal computer operating 
systems and software to also include the capability of developing web browsing applications 
when internet usage phenomenally increased. In each case, the firms were able to identify 
changing value drivers and adjust their business model to adapt to their business environment.  
 
Second, the firm is able to improve performance through the change in such value drivers. 
Current literature describes the performance of business models as that which requires a 
joined-up, systems-focused and holistic understanding across the firm’s existing resources and 
capabilities to achieve competitive advantage in the industry in which it sits (Zott et al., 2011). A 
successful business model performance is then achieved when a firm is able to narrow the gap 
  
 
7
between the firm’s existing resources and capabilities, and the basis of its competitive 
advantage in the industry as it evolves (Chesbrough, 2010).  
 
Third, network or partnership is a common feature in business model literature. Its literature 
proposed that firms recognise that multiple stakeholders (internal and external) need to 
interact and co-operate in order to face challenges (Zott & Amit, 2009). Also, its studies 
identified the formation of successful partnerships as capabilities in themselves, and in strategy 
literature, these are recognised as core competencies (Johnson et al., 2008). Recently, Nenonen 
and Storbacka (2009) discussed the ability of a firm to integrate customers into business 
transactions as partners under a co-production environment. Furthermore, according to Demil 
and Lecocq (2010), the firm’s “value chain of activities” should include the fostering of 
partnerships as part of the building blocks of a business model. 
  
In summary, new business models are seen to be more customer-centric (Mansfield & Fourie, 
2004), and they take on new forms of collaboration for value creation that necessitates a 
whole-system approach (Zott et al., 2011). More importantly, there is change in the unit of 
analysis from the firm to that of the value-creating system, which spans boundaries (Zott & 
Amit, 2010) and necessitates focus on organisational activities that contribute to that system. 
  
Yet, despite the interest in business models, there seems to be a foregone conclusion that 
changes in business models exhibit similar characteristics when, in fact, new business models 
emerge across different industries in different ways. For example, the changing business model 
of a brick-and-mortar business into an e-business (such as Borders from a physical bookstore to 
an online bookstore) may exhibit structural changes in governance, value creation or 
partnership that would be different from the changing business model of a camera 
manufacturer to a provider of digital images (such as Kodak). These changes suggest greater 
heterogeneity in its theoretical conceptualisation and in its empirical characterisation. 
Academic literature have yet to successfully develop a reconciliatory framework on the essence 
of a business model and why that is important; why, how and when business model changes 
occur or how or what capabilities should the firm be investing in. While current business model 
literature presents similar cross-cutting themes, more research is needed to empirically 
understand how these themes such as value drivers, partnerships, customer-centricity manifest 
themselves, and the relationships between them for different types of new business models, 
especially since a systems understanding of business models has constantly been proposed.  
 
In addition, while it is clear that new business models cut across various disciplines and 
theoretical approaches, there has been no concerted attempt to bring together extant 
theoretical approaches of the various disciplines of marketing, strategy, operations, and 
OBHRM in a trans-disciplinary manner and into an empirical context, to understand the 
characterisation of new business models. This would enable a better appreciation of how 
disciplinary approaches aid or hinder the understanding of a holistic business model. Only when 
we understand what is new and what is known can we build on its scholarship so that it can be 
usefully applied. 
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Given this discussion, our study aims to contribute to business model literature by integrating 
existing academic literature in strategy, operations management, marketing and OBHRM 
through an investigation of a new business model of OBC in equipment service. 
 
 
2.2 The New Business Model of OBC 
Outcome-based contracts between firms and customers are increasingly touted as the new 
business model for manufacturers underlined by more complex value-creating systems of 
products, people and activities. Traditional equipment-based service contracts are anchored on 
billable time and materials, with the cost of spare parts included for the maintenance, repair or 
overhaul of equipment as and when required to do so; the customer is billed for the service 
once the activities have been performed (Van Weele, 2002). Alternatively, the firm could also 
provide the customer with a cost-plus contract with detailed cost structures to ascertain 
reimbursement with a pre-determined profit percentage (Kim et al., 2007). Performance of 
such contracts are typically assessed based on respond time to breakdowns, speed of repairs, 
and other activities where there is a measurable way to assess the provider’s performance.  
 
Recently, there have been a growing number of contracts that focus on outcomes of equipment 
rather than the resources involved in its provision. For example, Rolls-Royce’s service to 
maintain engines is remunerated on the basis of how many hours the engine is in the air – a 
concept known as ‘power by the hour®’. Such outcome-based contracts focus on achieving 
required outcomes rather than meeting a set of prescribed specifications (Bramwell, 2003). As 
an analogy to Levitt’s Marketing Myopia (1960), this is akin to being paid for holes-in-walls, 
rather than for the maintenance, repair and upkeep of the drill. We argue that such a 
fundamental change to the value proposition of the firm would constitute a change in its 
business model. 
 
Theoretically, OBC manifest a change in the traditional business model in three ways that could 
be explained by strategy literature. First, it aligns the incentives of both parties towards the 
outcome. In relationships dominated by protection against opportunism, such as traditional 
contracts, firms may be reluctant to make unilateral and voluntary commitments outside the 
terms of the contract, preferring to take costly safeguards instead (Parkhe, 1993). In the case of 
service contracts, there is an issue of opportunism as there is no incentive for the firm to repair 
and maintain the equipment in such a way that would reduce future breakdowns, since 
breakdowns in equipment actually generate revenues for the provider. OBC creates a structure 
of mutual orientation that could mitigate such opportunistic behavior (Kale et al., 2002). This 
implies that OBC has an ability to elicit desired behaviours arising from the incentives within the 
contract, thus reducing the cost of servicing over the longer term for the customer. Current 
strategy literature suggests that if partners share ownership of an entity, such as an outcome, 
and are both ‘mutual hostages’ to the outcome, their incentive to behave opportunistically is 
likely to decrease (Teece et al., 1997). 
 
Second, OBC puts the risk of delivering outcomes primarily on the firm, and secondarily on the 
customer. Bearing a larger proportion of the risk in achieving outcomes provides the firm with 
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an opportunity to integrate resources for value creation in the use of the equipment with the 
customer (Madhok & Tallman, 1998), thus allowing the firm an opportunity to earn better 
revenues through more efficient and effective integration of both parties’ resources (Dyer, 
1997). Under these circumstances and in the long term, firms may find it in their interest to 
invest in designing more reliable products and more efficient repair and logistics capabilities to 
increase profitability.  
 
Finally, a firm that is capable of achieving such a coordination role in OBC, especially in its 
ability to coordinate, cooperate and collaborate with the customer, acquires superior 
organisational capability, which would allow it to extract further rents from the market through 
more of such contracts. The potential extraction of future rents from such a capability could 
incentivise the firm to willingly make commitments outside the terms of the contract, thus 
increasing the strength of the mutual orientation and turning OBC into a self-enforcing 
agreement. Scholars in strategy have discussed such an alliance capability as an important part 
of the firm’s strategies and a source of competitive advantage (Kale et al., 2002). 
  
All of this suggests that OBC is a new business model, as it changes the value drivers from billed 
activities to partnered outcomes (Demil & Lecocq, 2010); changing the focus from value 
capture to value co-creation (Shafer et al., 2005); changing the dominant logic of ‘selling to’ to 
‘creating value with’ the customer (Nenonen & Storbacka, 2009); and changing the unit of 
analysis away from the organisation to that of the collaborative value-creating system (Zott & 
Amit, 2010). 
  
Yet, delivering on OBC is challenging and requires the firm to be able to manage its 
collaboration with its customer (Ng & Nudurupati, 2010). Business model literature proposes 
the need to understand the change in organisational activities as a consequence (Zott & Amit, 
2009), particularly with the increased involvement and resource contribution by the customer. 
Indeed, there is a need to examine fundamental theoretical issues underpinning the dynamic 
firm-customer relationship in an OBC, particularly the issue of what constitutes the capability to 
coordinate, cooperate and manage such a business model where the capability lies in the way a 
firm is able to achieve cooperation with the customer, and the way stakeholders are able to 
appropriate resources towards equipment use outcomes. Literature in strategic alliance 
suggests that a successful alliance must be able to cooperate and combine resources of parties 
in the most efficient and effective manner (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Conceptual and 
empirical studies in alliance literature have highlighted the difficulties of achieving such 
coordination, citing the sharing of information, cultural differences and management of conflict 
as the three more prevalent challenges (Das & Teng 2000). 
However, OBC as a new business model goes beyond an alliance in three ways. First, the 
revenues for the firm are obtained from the collaborative performance of the contract, even if 
the firm has no control over the customer’s contribution. For example, Rolls-Royce’s ‘power by 
the hour’ earning revenues for each hour of engine in flight would depend on where the 
customer is flying (environmental conditions such as ash, sand etc.), and the customer’s ability 
to use the engine with due care. Second, this implies that the contract cannot be delivered by 
the firm on its own because the alliance between the firm and the customer is often implicit. 
  
 
10
Third, since contract performance is dependent on the customer’s involvement, the 
cooperation must be embedded in the value drivers of the contract itself i.e. the customer is 
part of the ‘production’ system.  
 
We propose that a successful change in business model to enable it to deliver on outcome-
based contracts therefore depends not only on how the firm develops the capability of 
achieving cooperation with the customer such as that proposed by alliance literature, but also 
on incorporating the value drivers into the cooperation itself. This view brings in marketing 
literature and accentuates value creation within a relationship i.e. value co-creation where 
resources i.e. “people, systems, infrastructures and information” (Gronroos, 2004) work 
together through processes to achieve the optimum benefit for the consumer. The value of the 
contract, and the relationship with the customer, is therefore embedded within a complex 
system of delivery and use (Normann & Ramirez, 1993). This suggests that delivering on OBC 
incorporates co-production and co-creation and necessitates a value-driven cooperative 
approach integrating marketing and strategy literature. Our study aims to shed light on how 
this capability can be developed through investment in relational assets. 
 
2.3 Relational Assets 
Within the strategy domain, some alliance literature suggests a transaction cost economics 
(TCE) approach to achieve cooperation. First, formal governance mechanisms compel 
cooperation by specifying contractually, the responsibilities and obligations of all parties (Reuer 
et al., 2002). Complex contracts may outline roles, procedures and penalties for non-
compliance and determine outcomes to be delivered. Such governance arrangements are 
necessary, usually as safeguards against dire consequences in the event of a breach (Joskow, 
1988). Literature in TCE has shown that formal mechanisms come with the hazards of asset 
specificity (i.e. the hold up problem), measurement difficulty and technological uncertainty 
(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Second, cooperation can also be achieved through relational 
governance. In such cases, inter-organisational exchanges involve exchanges embedded in 
social relationships (Macneil, 1978) which could reduce transaction costs (Dyer, 1997). Such 
social relationships are more fluid in nature and allow for flexibility, which facilitates adaptation 
to environmental changes that could strengthen cooperation through information sharing and 
solidarity (Mayer & Teece, 2008). 
 
Recent studies show that formal contracts and relational governance could be complementary, 
and that outcomes are achieved from an optimal configuration of formal and relational 
governance (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2008). Additionally, some scholars argue against 
transactional cost approaches, as it does not give sufficient credit to the benefits from 
collaboration such as learning, trust development, resource pooling and the reduction of 
environmental uncertainty from the trust. Common to most approaches is the need for both 
customer and firm to invest in relational specific assets of the alliance as described by Madhok 
and Tallman (1998) to be a “unique and productive resource for value creation and realization.”  
  
Studies into relational mechanisms between firms are also centred around trust and 
relationships which are essentially links between individuals in the firms. In changing the 
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business model to deliver on OBC, relational assets would have to involve the firm and 
individual level links. A great number of literature agree that inter-organisational relationships 
stress the value created by such alliances, and many studies have extolled the fact that alliances 
lead to better firm performances (Deeds & Hill, 1996) which is also echoed in business model 
literature. However, as we have discussed earlier, the new business model of OBC is not merely 
the building of an alliance to appropriate resources, but to incorporate value drivers within it. 
Hence, relationship specific assets are not just about the relationship as strategy or transaction 
cost literature would propose, but about the relationship in the actual value creating activities 
towards outcomes i.e. the ‘production’ relationship have to be value-driven in OBC. The 
investment in these value-driven relational assets would then fundamentally determine the 
performance of the contract, and the successful performance of the new business model. 
  
2.4 Value Drivers  
Business model literature proposes that a new business model must fundamentally understand 
how value is created at the different levels of the organisation as well as with different 
stakeholders connected to the organisation. Although some scholarly literature in alliances, 
especially within the resource-based view (RBV) domain discuss how firms seek partners to 
increase value-creating potential (Das & Teng, 2000), they are often discussed from the 
perspective of partner selection (Lin et al., 2009). There is little understanding in scholarly 
literature of what resources or capabilities are required to co-produce and indeed, what the 
value drivers are. Clearly, the nature of such value drivers – in terms of what is being 
transformed and how – is critical to the cooperation between the firm and its customer in an 
OBC, as it would dictate what resources are complementary. Thus, to understand value drivers, 
one would need to understand the key transformational processes that create value. In 
marketing literature, value drivers can be seen as managing relationships to improve 
performance (Richards & Jones 2008). 
For our study, our research question is to examine what are the value drivers in the 
management and delivery of outcome-based contracts as a new business model. We then 
review a diverse set of literature to discover the relational assets that could be specific to the 
firm-customer partnership, which would incorporate the value drivers discovered. We then 
operationalize and measure the relational asset constructs through a survey instrument so that 
we can quantitatively evaluate the influence the relational assets on outcome-based contract 
performance and their mitigating factors.  
 
2.5 Research Context, Design and Administration  
This study investigates the delivery of two MRO outcome-based service contracts between two 
defence contractors and the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD). The outcomes were the availability 
of two types of equipment; a fighter jet and a missile system. The first contract is to maintain a 
defined level of available mission-ready flying hours across a fleet of some 220 Tornado (fastjet) 
aircraft. The contractor is paid and incentivised for performance against outcome-based key 
performance indicators. The second contract provides partnered support for the British Army’s 
Rapier mobile air defence missile system. In this contract, the supplier is paid and incentivised 
for performance against outcome-based contract performance indicators, for which the 
primary outcome is to maintain a defined level of percentage availability of the missile system. 
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Since the contract is outcome-based, the customer has to commit to being responsible and 
abiding by the level of use stipulated in the contract, and the firm is obliged to deliver the 
outcome of a set number of flying hours on the fighter jet and a fixed percentage availability 
over a certain period of time for the missile system for the agreed usage. The delivery of these 
contracts serves as an exemplar for the new business model of OBC, where both firms and 
customers are focused on achieving collaborative outcomes of equipment. 
 
 
3. STUDY 1: QUALITATIVE STUDY - DISCOVERING VALUE DRIVERS 
 
3.1  Methodology 
A qualitative study was conducted to discover what the customer considers to be the firm’s 
value proposition. The data was collected in four ways. First, meetings and interviews were held 
to provide researchers with an understanding of the service rendered under the defence 
contracts, which tend to be riddled with jargon. The explanations of the contracts and the 
jargon in itself provided invaluable sets of qualitative data, as employees used their 
understanding of their world to convey their interpretation of the service delivered and the role 
they (and the customer) played within the system. Second, further insights were gained from 
32 in-depth interviews conducted over six months with employees from both sides to solicit a 
deeper understanding of their world and their role in the social construction of the 
environment. Third, we accompanied key employees in walking around the bases and the sites, 
observing, taking notes and recording their audio interactions with one another. Finally, 
minutes of meetings between the employees of both sides were collected and analysed, 
together with an analysis of presentations, reports and other text-based documents such as 
maintenance logs. In analysis, the data was coded and categorised by three researchers and 
triangulated through discussion between the three. The coding and categorisation centred on 
distilling and reducing the data to generic value drivers. 
 
3.2 Findings  
The research found that in the delivery of outcome-based contracts, value is co-produced with 
the customer through three value drivers. The three value drivers are: 
 
(a)   Transform materials and equipment (i.e. manufacturing and production, store, move, 
repair, install, discard materials and equipment through supply chain, repairs, obsolescence 
management, predictive maintenance, etc.) 
(b)  Transform information (i.e. design, store, move, analyse, change information through 
knowledge management, information, communication and technological strategies, data 
strategies in equipment management, etc.) 
(c)   Transform people’s behaviours (i.e. train use, change use, build trust through education, 
influence, build relationships, change mindsets, achieve mental states, etc.) 
 
Our study found that the firm predominantly designed its processes around the transformation 
of materials/equipment, considered to be the primary value driver of equipment-based service. 
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However, we found that in outcome-based equipment service, information and people 
transformation also became crucial in ensuring that outcomes were achieved. Yet, although 
both information and behavioural transformations were achieved by the firm, they were mostly 
tacitly delivered through the interactions of its employees and the customer at the 
management level, rather than the operational level. Finally, the three drivers interacted with 
one another. For example, the transformation of customers’ perceptions and usage of 
equipment (behaviours) had an impact on the supply chain (material/equipment 
transformation) and constantly changed the nature of how information was communicated 
both ways (information transformation). In other words, the three transformations are non-
linear, and conducted within the system where inputs could come from both the firm and the 
customer. 
 
Our qualitative study also found that value drivers from such a business model were not 
provided by the firm but were jointly created with the customer. In other words, value drivers 
could not be achieved by the firm themselves. Through the coded data, we found that the 
conduct of the firm and customer to create value necessitated an alignment between the firm 
and the customer processes in achieving the value drivers. These in turn were influenced by 
three factors; that of congruence of expectations of the firm by both parties, congruence of 
expectations of the customer by both parties, and complementary competencies between the 
employees of the firm. In addition, two further variables could intervene in the relationship – 
that of perceived control and degree of empowerment of the firm’s employees. These serve as 
the basis through which we investigate the relational assets specific to the new business model. 
To validate these qualitative observations, we present the hypotheses development for our 
quantitative study below. 
 
 
4. STUDY 2: QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
 
4.1 Hypothesis Development for Quantitative Study 
 
Relational assets within value-driven alignments. For the firm to be able to manage the new 
business model of partnered outcomes, our qualitative findings suggest that both customer and 
firm must invest in relational assets that exist both at individual and organisational levels to 
achieve the business model change that would improve contract performance. We argue that 
these relational assets should be embedded in the value drivers discovered previously. First, 
customer and firm systems to achieve value-creating activities must somehow be aligned. 
Alignment would then facilitate a symmetric transfer of resources, information and all that is 
necessary to ameliorate problems that may arise from the highly uncertain environmental 
factors that impact on co-creation to achieve outcomes. Such value-driven alignments must 
therefore be a relational asset for both parties to invest in. Our hypotheses suggest three types 
of value-driven alignments as relational assets.  
 
In the transformation of people, the coded data revealed that both parties discussed ideas of 
“building relationships”, “having a good relationship” and “getting along” as essential in their 
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business partnerships. The data also detected conversations of parties having to behave 
“sensibly” and “responsibly” in order for the services to be performed and rendered effectively. 
As such, an important relational asset to invest in is that both the firm and the customer 
understand that their behaviours are aligned to ensure effective and efficient cooperation. 
Therefore we hypothesise that: 
 
H1: Behavioral alignment is positively related to contract performance 
 
The qualitative study also highlighted that interactions at the customer interface (alignment) 
between the customer’s value-creating processes and the firm’s service delivery processes are 
important in managing the alliance. The development of linkages and shared ways of operating 
between firms and customers would ensure that both parties work smoothly together. Both 
partners should work together towards improving processes and products, showing their 
commitment to shared benefits. The benefits are that the companies can mobilise their 
resources to increase productivity by tightening the linkages which would include information 
transfer between both parties (Evans & Jukes, 2000). Thus, in the context of process alignment 
between firms and customers, information process alignment is the gathering, moving and 
storing of information between partners. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
H2: Information process alignment is positively related to contract performance 
 
According to Guimaraes and Bond (1996), determining set-up details, tooling, scheduling, 
maintenance, storage, and replenishment for materials and equipment are critical factors in 
equipment-based service. Thus, logistics and the supply chain are particularly relevant and both 
the firm and the customer should achieve material/equipment process alignment as a relational 
asset, i.e. synchronising both parties’ processes. Synchronising would enable the value creation 
and transfer process, right from the firm to the end customer, to operate as a seamless chain 
along which equipment and physical assets flow (Gunasekaran & Yusuf, 2002). As such, we 
hypothesise that: 
 
H3: Material/Equipment process alignment is positively related to contract performance 
 
Relational assets as partnership inputs. Our qualitative study found “competencies” to be an 
important relational specificity for co-creation. The study found broad agreements from both 
the firm and the customer that employing the “right people” with the right competencies and 
appropriate “judgment of environment state” was crucial to the day-to-day operations of the 
contracts and ultimately in building the business relationship. Hence, it is important to ensure 
that the skill sets presented in the relationship between the firm and the customer complement 
each other. According to Cox and Townsend (1997), where the firm competencies are not core 
or complementary to the customers’ business processes, a weak relationship of no value exists. 
Yusuf et al. (2004) proposes that the resource competencies required are often difficult to 
mobilise and retained by single companies. We propose that complementary competency is a 
partnership input (that is also a relational asset) to value-driven alignment constructs, and we 
hypothesise that: 
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H4: Complementary competency is positively associated with value-driven alignments of 
behavioral (A), information (B), and material/equipment (C) 
 
The communications among supply chain members may foster inter-organisational learning 
that is crucially important to competitive success. As Paulraj et al. (2008) state, such open and 
frequent communications is essential to the maintenance of value-enhancing relationships as 
they foster greater understanding of complex competitive issues related to supply chain 
success, which in turn may lead to increased behavioural transparency and reduced 
information asymmetry (Anderson & Weitz, 1992). Our study also suggested that clear 
communications about rights and congruence of expectations between firms and customers 
help the value co-production in MRO service (Woodruff & Flint, 2006). Customers need to trust 
the firms not to misuse the information provided by them and similarly, firms need to actively 
manage customer expectations. Both parties have to be congruent in the expectations of each 
other’s roles to achieve cooperation within the partnership. We propose that congruence of 
expectation is also a partnership input to the value-driven alignments, and hypothesise the 
following: 
 
H5: Congruence of expectations of self (the firm) is positively associated with value-driven 
alignments of behavioural (A), information (B), and material/equipment (C) 
 
H6: Congruence of expectations of other (the customer) is positively associated with value-
driven alignments of behavioral (A), information (B), and material/equipment (C) 
 
Intervening variables. Parts of our qualitative study found that the link between partnership 
inputs and value-driven alignments may not be straightforward. Two variables seemed to have 
played intervening roles.  
 
First, perceived control as a psychological construct has emerged from the qualitative coded 
data to be an important factor. Indeed, perceived control over job-related activities is a 
frequently-used construct in organisational behaviour and HRM (OBHRM) research (Smith et 
al., 1997). This is because humans have an essential need to control their work environment, 
and the desire for control arises because it is associated with positive outcome (Rodin et al., 
1980). This is also reflected in the study where the interviews reflected the importance of 
perceived control in the day-to-day operations of the contract delivery. Therefore, we 
hypothesise that: 
 
H7: Perceived Control mediates the relationship between partnership inputs and value-driven 
alignments 
 
Our qualitative study also found that empowerment was a key issue from both the firm’s and 
the customer’s perspectives. Both parties appeared to recognise that in order for effective 
partnership to take place, there must be willingness and a sense of empowerment for the 
individual to identify and effect changes especially with the customer operating in a high variety 
  
 
16
context and environmental uncertainty with contingency effects. Most literature on 
“empowerment” agree that psychological empowerment in the workplace is useful for 
organisations in understanding the quality of their service delivery (Spreitzer, 1995). Hence, we 
hypothesise that: 
 
H8: Empowerment for behavioural change mediates the relationship between partnership 
inputs and value-driven alignments 
 
 
4.2 Relationship between Partnership inputs, Value-driven Alignments and Contract 
Performance 
The relationships between the above theoretical variables of relational assets, intervening 
variables and contract performance are represented in Figure 1. We suggest that the set of 
inputs (complementary competency, congruence of expectations of self (the firm), and 
congruence of expectations of other (the customer) influence value-driven alignments at 
behavioural, information, and material/equipment levels, which in turn influence contract 
performance.  The expected causal relationship between inputs and alignments may also be 
mediated by the intervening variables of perceived control and empowerment.  All the 
hypothesised directions of causal relationships are assumed to be positive in this study. Note 
that the five relational asset variables depend on customer-firm engagement, and would be 
irrelevant should one partner breaks the contract, thus reinforcing its nature as specific 
relational assets. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  A model of contract performance in an outcome-based equipment service 
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4.3 Research Methodology for Study 2 
In conducting the quantitative study, we operationalised the constructs into perceptual 
measures i.e. the constructs of which measures were developed were constructs from the 
perceptions of the attributes by individuals delivering the contract, as previous research has 
shown that individual level relationships drive value (Bolton et al., 2008). We felt this was 
necessary as it continued to allow us to take a strategic approach in understanding the change 
in business model. In case there were gaps in operationalising and measuring these constructs, 
we proposed modification or construction of new scales for the purpose of measuring the 
constructs. Due to the adaptations and modifications in items scales, one of our objectives was 
to perform content face validity of the items and scales with the experts in this field. To achieve 
this, the items were submitted to five academics and five industrialists working in the field of 
service research with expertise in availability-based contracts. We provided each expert with a 
detailed definition of each item and asked them to either accept or reject the premise that each 
particular item reflected the construct (or attribute). When a majority of the experts responded 
that an item did not reflect the construct, we removed the item. Similarly, we included a few 
items based on the experts’ comments (Gatignon et al., 2002). Some measures (questions) 
were worded to be positively slanted while others were negatively worded to reduce the 
possibility that the respondents would simply agree or disagree with all the measures without 
providing adequate attention to reading and comprehending the questions.  
 
The measures were entered into a web-based survey and sent to all 1,500 individuals 
managing, delivering, and supporting outcome-based contracts in 2009. The web-based survey 
also prevented users from referring to the responses they had given to earlier questions, to 
reduce possible common variance problems that could result in inflated reliability measures 
(Stanton, 1998). Of the 1500, 116 responses were received for the survey. The elimination of 
incomplete responses resulted in 96 usable responses which were then used for further 
analysis. To ensure that we captured the ‘web-like’ nature of the service and its interactions, 
we received responses from across the firm and at all levels from management to support 
(administrative) to the actual technical and physical delivery of the service. All respondents 
have been involved in both contracts during the years of 2008-2009, with 52% working as 
professionals and 25% working as executives.   
 
4.4 Measurement Model Analysis and Testing  
We first performed a principal component analysis with direct Oblimin rotation and a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to evaluate our scales (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). We 
followed the two-step approach for our measurement model construction and eliminated 
measured variables or latent factors that did not fit well in the initial CFA model. We then 
performed a separate CFA for each construct to assess whether any structural model exhibited 
an acceptable goodness-of-fit level. As a result, we removed three measurement items; two for 
the control construct and one for the empowerment construct that did not load properly. We 
then fitted the structural model to the purified measured variables retained from the first step.  
 
In Table 1, we display the estimates of item loadings and reliability for the investigated 
constructs in an unconstrained analysis. To examine the psychometric properties of the 
  
 
18
measurement model, we analysed the indicators and constructs for reliability, convergent 
validity, and discriminant validity. Each investigated construct provides a Cronbach’s alpha 
value and composite reliability greater than .7, in support of the satisfactory reliability of our 
scales (Fornell, 1992). We assessed the convergent validity of our scales at both item and 
construct levels by examining the item loadings and average variance extracted (AVE). An 
individual item loading greater than .7 suggests an indicator shares more variance with the 
construct it measures than with error variances (Gefen et al., 2000). An AVE greater than .5 
manifests a construct that shares more variance with its indicators than with error variances.  
As we show in Table 1, most items load highly on the constructs they measure with item 
loadings of .7 or greater, except for three indicators. Our measurement items also converge 
properly on their intended constructs. The items exhibit good convergent validity, as suggested 
by the AVE of greater than .5 for each investigated construct.  
 
Table 1: Construct Measures 
 
Construct Measures on a Likert Scale of 1-5 with 1= strongly disagree and 5 strongly 
agree 
PARTNERSHIP INPUTS 
Complementary 
Competencies  
(Sheridan et al 
2001, Wong et al 
1999, Yusuf et al 
2004, Hanna 2007, 
Zhu et al. 2004, 
Stratman et al 
2002) 
Q97. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side 
have complementary skill sets to get the work done  
Q98. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side 
have complementary roles (i.e. job title and description) to get the work done  
Q99. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side 
are able to access resources necessary to get the work done  
Q100. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company 
side are able to access the technology necessary to get the work done 
Congruence of 
Expectations of self  
(Dean, 2004, 
Zeithmal et al, 
1993, Parasuraman 
et al 1994, 
Leventhal 2008) 
Q64. I believe the personnel I interact with on the company/customer side 
knows what I am doing under the contract 
Q145. I believe the personnel I interact with on the company/customer side 
knows HOW I am doing the job under the contract 
Q65. I believe the personnel I interact with on the company/customer side 
knows what I WILL DO under the contract 
Q66. I believe the personnel I interact with on the company/customer side 
knows what I SHOULD DO under the contract 
Q146. I believe the personnel I interact with on the company/customer side 
knows HOW I SHOULD DO my job under the contract 
Q67. I believe the personnel I interact with on the company/customer side 
knows what I WANT TO DO under the contract 
 
Congruence of 
Expectations of 
other   
(Dean, 2004, 
Zeithmal et al, 
1993, Parasuraman 
Q60. I am clear on what the personnel I interact with on the 
company/customer side is doing under the contract 
Q142. I am clear on HOW the personnel I interact with on the 
company/customer side is doing his/her job under the contract 
Q61. I am clear on what the personnel I interact with on the 
company/customer side WILL DO under the contract 
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et al 1994, 
Leventhal 2008) 
Q62. I am clear on what the personnel I interact with on the 
company/customer side SHOULD DO under the contract 
Q143. I am clear on HOW the personnel I interact with on the 
company/customer side SHOULD DO his/her job under the contract 
Q63. I am clear on what the personnel I interact with on the 
company/customer side WANT TO DO under the contract 
 
VALUE-DRIVEN ALIGNMENTS 
Information 
Alignment 
(Hung et al 2007, 
Guimaraes et al 
1996, Evans et al 
2000, Gunasekaran 
et al 2002, Yusuf et 
al 2004 
Q71. The company's processes of GATHERING information is aligned with the 
customer's processes to enable the gathering of information 
Q72. The company’s processes of GIVING information is aligned with the 
customer’s processes to receive the information 
Q73. The company’s processes of STORING information is aligned with the 
customer’s processes to enable the storage of information 
Q74. The company’s processes of MOVING the information is aligned with the 
customer’s processes to enable the movement of information 
 
Material/Equipment 
Alignment 
(Hung et al 2007, 
Guimaraes et al 
1996, Evans et al 
2000, Gunasekaran 
et al 2002, Yusuf et 
al 2004 
Q75. The company’s processes of COLLECTING the material and equipment is 
aligned with the customer’s processes to enable the collection of material 
and equipment 
Q76. The company’s processes of STORING the material and equipment is 
aligned with the customer’s processes to enable the storage of the material 
and equipment 
Q77. The company’s processes of MOVING the material and equipment is 
aligned with the customer’s processes to enable the movement of the 
material and equipment 
Q141. The company’s processes of REPAIRING the material and equipment is 
aligned with the customer’s processes to enable the movement of the 
material and equipment 
Q96. The company’s processes of INSTALLING the material and equipment is 
aligned with the customer’s processes to enable the installation of the 
material and equipment 
 
Behavioral 
Alignment 
(Leuthesser et al 
1995, Reich et al 
2000, Reich et al 
1996) 
Q35. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side 
give each other a clear picture of what goes on behind the scenes in our 
organization that may impact our work 
Q36. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side 
give each other ample notice of planned changes that might impact our 
operations 
Q37. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side 
do a good job of notifying each other in advance of any schedule changes 
Q38. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side  
would discuss any plans that might change the nature of the work we are 
doing 
Q39. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side 
take the time needed to discuss new ideas 
Q40. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side 
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co-operate in order to APPLY new ideas 
Q41. Myself and the personnel I interact with on the customer/company side 
share (reasonable) resources to help in our day to day operations 
 
INTERVENING VARIABLES 
Perceived Control 
(Smith et al 1997, 
White 1959, Rodin 
et al 1980, Karsek 
1979, Ganster 1989, 
Dwyer and Ganster 
1991) 
Q24. I feel that I have control over the decisions that affect my work 
Q25. I feel that I have control over the VARIETY OF METHODS I employ in 
completing my work 
Q26. I feel that I can choose among a VARIETY OF TASKS to do 
Q27. I feel that I have total control over the quality of the work I'm delivering 
Q28. I feel that I can dictate how quickly or slowly I have to work 
Q29. I feel that I am able to decide when to schedule my rest breaks 
Q32. I feel that I have influence over the policies and procedures of my work 
unit 
 
Empowerment 
(Conger et al 1988, 
Schulz et al 1995, 
Spreitzer 1995, 
Thomas et al 1990) 
Q48. When interacting with personnel from the customer/company side, I am 
good at turning problems into opportunities 
Q49. When interacting with personnel from the customer/company side, I 
feel I can use my personal judgment to ensure good contract performance 
Q50. When interacting with personnel from the customer/company side, I 
feel that my line manager supports me even when I go beyond the normal call 
of duty 
Q57. When interacting with personnel from the customer/company side, I 
feel I can use tactics that would ensure good contract performance 
Q51. When interacting with personnel from the customer/company side, I 
feel I can do more than what my job specifies to ensure good contract 
performance 
Q52. When interacting with personnel from the customer/company side, I 
feel I have significant autonomy in that interaction 
 
Contract 
Performance 
For the contract you are involved in, how do you think it's going so far? 
Q16a.The contract is performing well overall 
Q16b.The contract is doing well on the company side 
Q16c.The contract is doing well on the customer side 
 
Finally, we examined discriminant validity by comparing the correlations among constructs and 
the AVE values.  In general, the square root of the AVE for a construct should be greater than 
the correlations between that construct and all other constructs. As shown in Table 2, the 
square roots of the AVE are greater than any of the corresponding correlations. Hence, our 
scales exhibit appropriate discriminant validity. We sought additional support for discriminant 
validity by comparing item loadings and cross-loadings in Table 1. All the items load 
substantially higher on intended construct than on other constructs, thus further suggesting our 
scales possessed adequate discriminant validity (Fornell, 1992). 
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Table 2: Item Loadings  
 
Construct SL CR AVE Items 
Complementary 
Competencies  (ξ1) 
 . 81 .61 
Myself and the personnel I interact with on the 
customer/company side have 
 .78    ……  complementary skill sets to get the work done 
 .74   ……   complementary roles to get the work done 
 
.79 
  
 ……  are able to access resources necessary to get the work 
done 
 .81    ……  are able to access the technology to get the work done 
Congruence of 
Expectations of self 
(ξ2) 
 .91 .61 
I believe the personnel I interact with on the 
company/customer side 
 
 .68    know what I am doing under the contract 
 .82    ……  how I am doing the job under the contract 
 .78    ……  what I will do under the contract 
 .82    ……  what I should do under the contract 
 .83    ……  how I should do my job under the contract 
 .75    ……  what I want to do under the contract 
Congruence of 
Expectations of 
other (ξ3) 
 . 87 .54 
I am clear on what the personnel I interact with on the 
company/customer side 
 .78    ……  is doing under the contract 
 .84    ……  is doing his/her job under the contract 
 .83    ……  will do under the contract  
 .63    ……  should do under the contract 
 .67    ……  should do his/her job under the contract 
 .62    ……  want to do under the contract 
Behavioral  
Alignment  (η1) 
 . 87 .54 
Myself and the personnel I interact with on the 
customer/company side 
 .64   
…… give each other a clear picture of what goes on behind 
the scenes in our organization that may impact our work 
 .75   
…… give each other ample notice of planned changes that 
might impact our operations 
 .77   
…… do a good job of notifying each other in advance of any 
schedule changes 
 .63   
…… would discuss any plans that might change the nature of 
the work we are doing 
 .77   …… take the time needed to discuss new ideas 
 .81   …… co-operate in order to APPLY new idea   
Information  
Alignment (η2) 
 .81 .52 The company's processes of 
 .78   
……   gathering information is aligned with the customer's 
processes to enable the gathering of information 
 .76   
……   giving information is aligned with the customer’s 
processes to receive the information 
 .61   ……   storing information is aligned with the customer’s 
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processes to enable the storage of information 
 .73   
……   moving the information is aligned with the customer’s 
processes to enable the movement of information 
Material  
Alignment (η3) 
 .87 .58 
The company's processes of 
 .85   
……  collecting the material &equipment is aligned with the 
customer’s processes  
 .76   
……  storing the material & equipment is aligned with the 
customer’s processes  
 .86   
……  moving the material & equipment is aligned with the 
customer’s processes  
 .78   
……  repairing the material & equipment is aligned with the 
customer’s processes  
 .53   
……  installing the material & equipment is aligned with the 
customer’s processes  
Perceived Control 
(η4) 
 .84 .52 I feel that  
 .74   ……   I have control over the decisions that affect my work 
 
.80 
  
……   I have control over the variety of methods in 
completing work 
 .68    ……  I can choose among a variety of tasks to do 
 
.73 
  
 ……  I have total control over the quality of the work I'm 
delivering  
 .63    ……  I can dictate how quickly or slowly I have to work 
Empowerment (η5)  .83 .52 
When interacting with personnel from the 
customer/company side 
 .74   ……   I am good at turning problems into opportunities 
 
.80 
  
……   I feel I can use personal judgment to ensure contract 
performance 
 
.68 
  
 ……  I feel I can use tactics that would ensure good contract 
performance 
 
.73 
  
 ……  I feel I can do more than job specifies to ensure 
performance  
 .63   ……   I feel I have significant autonomy in that interaction 
Contract  
Performance  (η6) 
 . 91 .77 
For the contract you are involved in, how do you think it's 
going so far  
 .87   …… The contract is performing well overall 
 .90   …… The contract is doing well on the company side 
 .86   …… The contract is doing well on the customer side 
     
Note: SL = standardized loadings; CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. Items are 
measured on seven-point scales, where 1 represents strongly agree, 4 is the neutral point, and 7 is 
strongly disagree.  
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4.5 Examining Common Method Bias Analysis 
Because each respondent answers questions on items pertaining to both independent and 
dependent variables, we must assess potential common method bias, though the specificity of 
the measurement items and our use of adequate anchors for different scales should reduce this 
bias. We first performed Harmon’s single-factor test using exploratory factor analysis to 
determine if a single factor emerges or a general factor accounts for the majority of the 
covariance. Our results indicate that none of the nine factors account for the majority of the 
variances. We also examined the common method bias by adding a latent variable that 
presents common method. Our results reveal that when adding a latent variable that 
represents common method, model fit improved (χ
2
 difference = 8.65, df = 492, p < .01) but the 
variance accounted for by the common method latent variable was only 5.9% of the total 
variance. Together, these results suggest that common method bias is not a serious threat to 
our analysis (Calson & Perrewe, 1999). 
 
4.6 Analysis Method  
To test the set of hypotheses, we applied the Partial Least Square (PLS) method to investigate 
the proposed relationships among co-production inputs, co-production alignments, intervening 
variables, and contract performance. Based on component construct concept, PLS is ideally 
suited to the early stage of theory building and testing and especially appropriate when the 
researcher is primarily concerned with prediction of the dependent variable (Fornell, 1992). 
Compared with two-stage least squares, PLS considers all path coefficients simultaneously and 
allow direct, indirect, and spurious relationships and estimates the individual item weightings in 
the context of the theoretical model rather than in isolation (Birkinshaw et al., 1995).  In 
addition, the PLS procedure has been increasingly used in business research because of its 
ability to model latent constructs under conditions of non-normality and small-to-medium 
sample sizes (Chin et al., 2003). The structural equations in PLS are specified as follows: 
 
( ) ξηβξηη ×Γ+×= *,|E  
 
( )
m
ηηηηη ,...,, 21= and ( )mξξξξ ,...,, 21=  are vectors of unobserved criterion and explanatory 
latent variables, respectively. ( )mm×*β  is a matrix of coefficient parameters (with zeros in the 
diagonal) for η ; and ( )mm×Γ  is a matrix of coefficient parameters for ξ .  
 
PLS estimation proceeds in two stages. First, the latent variables are estimated in an iterative 
manner by finding successive approximations. The PLS algorithm involves alternations between 
the measurement and structural model where parameter estimates in either part of the model 
are treated as fixed as the parameters in the other part are estimated. Second, upon 
convergence, the measurement and structural relations are estimated by OLS regressions using 
the latent variables estimated in the first stage. Alternatively, the latent variables partial least-
squares model is essentially a path analytic model with latent variables.
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The PLS estimates and associated p values of the structural model are reported in Table 3. The 
sequence of reported results follows the discussion of the model developed earlier and is 
represented in Figure 2. The overall fit of the structural model can be evaluated by the 
incidence of significant relationships among the constructs on the one hand, and by the 
explained variance of the endogenous latent variables on the other. Table 3 shows that several 
individual relationships do not pass the .05 significance hurdle. Further, the R squares of 
behavioural alignment, information alignment, material and equipment alignment, and 
contract performance are .55, .35 .29, and .22 respectively. Given that alignments and contract 
performance are the central focuses of the model, it can be concluded that a satisfactory fit is 
obtained. Empirical results are reported below. The 'direct' relations among constructs are 
discussed first. Thereafter, 'mediating' effects will be considered and contrasted with the 
'direct' effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Structural model of contract performance in outcome-based equipment service
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4.7 Direct Effect 
 
Value-driven Alignments and contract performance. It was hypothesised that the value-driven 
alignments between customer and firm systems facilitate a symmetric transfer of resources, 
information and all that is necessary to deliver outcomes. The results in Table 3 and Figure 2 
suggest that both behavioural and information alignments provide significant explanatory 
power on contract performance, yet the material and equipment alignment does not have a 
significant effect on contract performance ( 61β = .40
∗∗∗
, 62β = .13
∗
, 63β = .00). Judging from the 
size of the path-coefficients, one can conclude that in the context of the outcome-based 
contract, the direct effect of behavioural alignment and information alignment are quite 
important to achieve desired outcomes. However, material and equipment alignment does not 
have a significant effect on contract performance. Therefore, while H1 and H2 are supported, 
H3 is not.  
 
Partnership inputs and Value-driven alignments. The results from hypotheses H4 through H6 
in Table 3 shed light on the relationship between partnership inputs and value-driven 
alignments.  It was hypothesised that partnership inputs serve as a driver to facilitate value-
driven alignments. Our data suggests that the complementary skills and competencies between 
the firm and customers greatly contribute to symmetric transfer of resources including 
behaviour ( 11γ = .23
***
), information ( 21γ = .42
***
), and materials and equipment ( 31γ = .39
∗∗∗
 ) 
during the co-production of the service. In addition, the positive relation between congruencies 
of expectation and value-driven alignments add further insights to the question of whether pre-
existing expectations drive the alignments in co-production. Congruencies of expectations for 
both self and other positively affect behavioural alignment at 12γ = .32
∗∗∗ 
and 13γ =.34
∗∗∗ 
, 
respectively. Yet, the congruency of expectation of self has a direct effect on material and 
equipment alignment ( 32γ = .14
∗
) while the congruency of expectation of other has a direct 
effect on information alignment ( 23γ = .14
∗
). Therefore, H4 is supported while H5 and H6 are 
partially supported.  
 
 
4.8 Mediating Effect 
Perceived control and empowerment as the mediators of value-driven alignments. Building on 
organisational behaviour research (Smith et al., 1997), we hypothesise that partnership inputs 
affect value-driven alignments through their effects on perceived control and empowerment 
(H7 & H8). The mediation hypotheses require the test of the following equations: (1) the effects 
of partnership inputs on value-driven alignments; (2) the combined effects of perceived control 
and empowerment and partnership inputs on value-driven alignments; and (3) the effects of 
partnership inputs on perceived control and empowerment. As suggested by Baron and Kenny 
(1986), all of these effects must be significant, but the significance of the associations between 
partnership inputs and value-driven alignments must be reduced by adding control and 
empowerment to the model.  
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The positive effects of partnership inputs on corresponding alignments are shown in Table 4 
(Models 1, 3, and 5). The direct effects of partnership inputs on value-driven alignments have 
been confirmed in H4-H6, which suggest that complementary competencies and congruency of 
expectations significantly improve alignments. When control and empowerment are added into 
each model for corresponding alignment, the effects of co-production inputs on alignments are 
reduced.  While empowerment is associated with significant improvement of behavioural 
alignment (0.22, p < .01) and information alignment (0.13, p < .05), control is associated with 
significant improvements of information alignment (0.24, p <.01) and material & equipment 
alignment (0.13, p < .05).  
 
 
To complete the mediation hypotheses, it is important to show that partnership inputs are 
associated with increased levels of control and empowerment for each of the alignment 
context. As shown in Table 5, complementary competencies and congruency of expectations 
are associated with a higher level of control and empowerment across all three value-driven 
alignments.  To further test the mediation effects, we used the Sobel test or the product-of-
coefficients approach to compute the ratio of ab (a: path coefficient between the independent 
variable and the mediator; b: path coefficient between the mediator and the dependent 
variable) and its estimated standard error (Sobel, 1986). We computed the p value for this ratio 
in reference to the standard normal distribution, and use the significance level to test the 
hypotheses of mediation. The Sobel test suggests that empowerment positively and 
significantly mediates the relationship between partnership inputs and behavioral alignment at 
z=2.07, p <.05 level, while perceived control positively and significantly mediates the 
relationship between partnership inputs and information alignment at z = 2.04, p < .05 level.  
Based on the above tests, H7 and H8 are partially supported.  
 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
Our qualitative findings discovered that in outcome-based equipment service contracts, the 
value drivers are three forms of transformation of information, material and behaviours. We 
propose, through our hypotheses, that achieving contract performance requires the firm and 
the customer to invest in five relational assets specific to the contracts on the basis of these 
value drivers. We operationalise them in the form of partnership inputs (complementary 
competency and congruence of expectations) and value-driven process alignments 
(information, material and people) and hypothesise their impact on contract performance. We 
also suggest that the relationship between partnership inputs and value-driven alignments 
could be mediated by intervening variables (perceived control and empowerment) set out in 
OBHRM literature. Our quantitative findings provide an insight into the challenge of delivering 
the new business model of outcome-based contracts. Hypotheses 1 and 2 show that contract 
performance is dependent upon both behavioural and information alignments. This is 
expected, as outcome performance should be dependent on how seamless the collaborative 
work is between the firm and customer. That material and equipment alignment is not related 
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to contractual performance is at first surprising for an equipment-based service but upon 
reflection, this is intuitively plausible since outcome-based equipment essentially puts the 
entire supply chain and its installation of parts and equipment into the hands of the firm to 
achieve the outcome of use of the equipment by the customer. Thus, alignment of 
material/equipment processes (i.e. the supply chain) with the customer’s processes may not be 
as relevant to contract performance, which is an interesting result for supply chain literature. 
Current literature in this area has proposed several joint supply chain mechanisms (Li & Wang, 
2007). Our study shows that the OBC business model renders firm-customer joint supply chain 
irrelevant. Hypothesis 4 shows that complementary competencies drive all value-driven 
alignments as we have proposed, emphasising the importance of the complementarity of 
resources such as skills, assets and knowledge in the new business model. In the case of 
Hypotheses 5 and 6, congruence of expectations drive behavioural alignment but congruency of 
expectations of self is not related to information alignment, whilst congruency of expectations 
of other is not related to material/equipment alignment. The latter point is consistent with the 
unsupported Hypothesis 3, since if material/equipment alignment is inconsequential to 
contract performance, expectations of the other by self may then not be deemed to be 
essential to material/equipment alignment. With regard to congruency of expectations of the 
self by the other being unrelated to information alignment, we can only surmise that sharing of 
information transcends the customer’s knowledge of his/her counterpart, throwing light on the 
heterogeneity of co-production dynamics. 
 
The mediating effects Hypotheses 7 and 8 add a further level of insight. Control and 
empowerment clearly mediate the relationship between all the partnership inputs with 
behavioural alignment, which is expected since these variables embody strong human resource 
issues. Yet, control and empowerment also mediate the relationship between the 
complementary competencies, expectations of self by other, and value-driven alignments of 
material/equipment and information suggesting that for outcome-based contracts, HR and 
relational issues have a wider and bigger impact on co-production, affecting operational 
processes and supply chains as well. Even if there are complementary competencies and 
congruence of expectations between the firm and its customer, a lack of perceived control and 
empowerment of employees would result in less effective alignments, causing reduced contract 
performance. This may be due to the complexity and variety of working together in a non-linear 
manner where both the firm and customer’s role towards achieving outcomes may not be 
systematically articulated or understood. Thus, control and empowerment could drive 
behaviours needed to make the relationship work, given the contingencies expected from the 
complexity of the equipment use system. This suggests that operations, management, strategy 
and relationships are all considered value-creating activities with impact on contract 
performance.  
 
Our study contributes to existing literature in a few ways.  
 
First, we demonstrate how business model themes such as value-driven focus and partnership 
orientation manifest themselves in the context of the OBC business model, with a focus on the 
value-creating system as the unit of analysis. We present the relationships as relational assets 
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within an empirical context and suggest that the dynamics of the business models in general 
may not be acontextual as it seems; future business models could recognise the diversity of 
new business models and the way performance is achieved for different types of business 
models. 
 
Second, from a theoretical perspective, we have taken a more systematic approach to 
incorporating marketing, operations, OBHRM and strategy literature, achieving a more concrete 
specification of how the delivery of the new business model of OBC is achieved that is mapped 
onto theoretical foundations. Such a trans-disciplinary approach provides a greater 
understanding of the firm’s holistic capability to deliver on OBC that is rooted on existing 
fundamental concepts. The result is a richer model that can serve as a starting point for future 
research concerning the new business model of OBC.  
 
Third, our study contributes to the nature of the relational assets in delivering outcome-based 
contracts that is partnership-focused and value-driven. Specifically, we show that relational 
assets are investments that should be made on the essential links not only between individuals, 
but between firms’ systems and processes.  For decision makers, our findings reinforce the 
need to take a more holistic view of people, processes, behaviours, competencies and 
infrastructures. Our study shows that people and equipment interact to create collaborative 
value with interactions between what is seen as traditional management roles and traditional 
operational roles. Within such a system for outcomes, value-creating activities include joint 
management roles, joint strategy roles, as well as joint operational roles within the 
transformations.  
 
In terms of disciplinary literature, our study raises an uncomfortable issue as traditional 
boundaries of operations, management, marketing and strategy seem to collapse under the 
OBC business model. For example, with use-outcomes as the new boundaries for the OBC joint-
supply chain, it is no longer relevant to be discussing linear or sequential joint-supply chains (Li 
& Wang, 2007). Supply chain activities within OBC are also interacting with joint behaviours and 
information flows suggesting that a holistic approach may be more relevant. Similarly in terms 
of relationship marketing and service, our study finds that relationship management within an 
OBC business model is embedded in joint work between the firm and the customer. In other 
words, relationship management (marketing) is embedded within delivery (operations) and one 
has to consider the building of relationships as part of the delivery processes and not separated 
from it. Hence, while our study improves the understanding of how collaboration occur it shows 
a stark inadequacy of current management literature that compartmentalises the knowledge 
into existing disciplinary silos. Business disciplines may need to think of new ways of organising 
knowledge about firms in new business models rather than stay with traditional disciplines of 
strategy, marketing, OBHRM and operations since boundaries between them may no longer be 
relevant.  Similarly, from a practice perspective, the new business model of OBC suggests that 
traditional understanding of how firms should organise themselves into functions may no 
longer be effective in new business models such as OBC. There is an urgent need to research 
into new ways of organising the firm as well as its relationship with its partners and markets, if 
the firm intends to create value more effectively with its customers. 
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As an empirical study, this paper exhibits several limitations. First, the customer in the chosen 
outcome-based contracts is primarily a government body.  Such a context may be more unique 
and could limit the external validity, which we sacrificed in the interest of internal validity in 
understanding the workings of the new business model of outcome-based equipment 
contracts. Future research could take on other domains of such contracts. A further limitation 
of our study is that we chose to investigate two dyads of co-production. Modern supply chains 
are often multi-organisational networks with various stakeholders responsible for different 
components of the total value offering. Further research should extend the current study 
towards network co-production and alignments to achieve the value drivers. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The study of new business models is often complex and constitutes a ‘messy’ problem, with 
several interacting components across disciplines and functions. Our study illustrates a 
systematic view of how various theoretical streams in marketing, OBHRM, operations and 
strategy overlap in complex practice and proposes that future research in new business models 
could apply a similar approach. 
 
Through such an integration, we also provide a systematic understanding of the OBC delivery, 
contributing to continuing scholarly work on managing and delivering outcome-based 
contracts, and the challenge in acquiring such a capability.  
 
Finally, our study is important for both researchers and practitioners to understand the role of 
outcome-based contracts in adopting a sustainability agenda. The capability to manage the new 
business model of continuous equipment use through collaboration could lead to OBC being an 
enduring and viable alternative for equipment manufacturers and customers in achieving long-
term use of equipment rather than continuing on the path of producing, consuming and 
discarding equipment. 
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